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It is extraordinarily unlikely that the drafters of ERISA' foresaw the
effect the statute would have on federal courts and American economic
life. It was originally conceived as a "pension bill of rights"2 designed
to ensure that workers received the fixed monthly pension payment
(based on tenure and average salary) that they had been promised.3
It grew, however, into the most litigated statute in the United States
Code; to govern increasingly popular individual retirement savings
accounts, e.g., 401(k) accounts;4 to be the central statute regulating
employment based health insurance, which covers over one hundred and
sixty million people;' to be one of the most anti-federalist statutes in
force, depriving states of large swathes of power to regulate insurance,
historically an area of state dominion;6 and to regulate almost entirely,
the group of private arrangements that collectively allocates several
* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law; JD Harvard Law School;
AB Stanford University. Chairman, American Association of Law Schools Section on Employee
Benefits & Executive Compensation. I thank the Hofstra Labor & Employment Journal for inviting
me to participate in this special issue.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 18 §§ 1001-1461 (2006)
("ERISA").
2. Ryan P. Barry, ERISA's Purpose: The Conveyance of Information from Trustee to
Beneficiary, 31 CONN. L. REV. 735, 750 (1999) (citing 120 CONG. REc. S1537, S15743 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Javits)).
3. See id at 749-50.
4. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974:
A POLITICAL HISTORY 279 (2004); Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 445, 448-49 (2010) (noting the prevalence of 401(k) arrangements).
5. See Sara R. Collins, Chapin White & Jennifer L. Kriss, Whither Employer-Based Health
Insurance? The Current and Future Role of US. Companies in the Provision and Financing of
Health Insurance, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Sept. 2007, at 7 fig.1, available at http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2007/Sep/Whither-Employer-
Based-Health-Insurance-The-Current-and-Future-Role-of-U-S--Companies-in-the-Provis.aspx.
6. See Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits ofOpt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1756-58
(2011).
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trillion dollars for the elderly and the ill.7
The importance and reach of the statute, coupled with its expansive
preemptive shadow, resulted in an intensified interest in ERISA's
remedies, which are often the only remedies a plaintiff may be able to
pursue.8  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly, if not
habitually, addressed itself to the matter of ERISA's remedies.9
Regrettably, frequent Supreme Court attention has done little to clarify
many important questions regarding ERISA's remedies. Below, the
latest round of confusion on ERISA's remedies is analyzed, and
opinions on a resolution are offered.
Part I offers a brief background on ERISA. Part II examines the
pleading confusion that has arisen in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Varity v. Howe. Part III considers the Court's recent opinion
7. In 2006, for example, retirement plans governed by ERISA held more than $5.5 trillion in
assets. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUND ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FIRST QUARTER 2007, 113 (2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20070607/zl.pdf.
8. ERISA preempts most state laws that regulate private employee benefit agreements, and
it expressly preempts state law remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.");
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 146-147 (1985). As a result, many observers have expressed concern over the Act's
broad preemptive reach coupled with the Supreme Court's historically narrow interpretation of the
remedies available under ERISA. As United States Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg put it:
"Because the [Supreme] Court has coupled an encompassing interpretation of ERISA's preemptive
force with a cramped construction of the . .. relief[ ] allowable under [ERISA], a 'regulatory
vacuum' exists: '[V]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes
are provided."' Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring)). This has resulted in a call from many observers for congressional reform of the
statute's remedial provisions. See, e.g., Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he injury that the courts have done to ERISA will not be healed until the
Supreme Court reconsiders the existence of consequential damages under the statute, or Congress
revisits the law to the same end."); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.
Mass. 1997) ("This case,,thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for Congress to
amend ERISA ... [which] has evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers,
utilization review providers, and other managed care entities from potential liability for the
consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits." (footnote omitted)); Kathym J. Kennedy,
Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1083, 1091 (2001)
("Although the intent of the preemption clause was to provide uniformity regarding the
administration of plan benefits, it is now being used as a shield for plan fiduciaries and insurers to
limit their liability under these plans. Such a result is inconsistent with ERISA's overall objective to
protect participants' rights.").
9. See, e.g., CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011); Conkright v. Frommert, 130
S. Ct. 1640 (2010); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). See also US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
340 [Vol. 30:339
ERISA'S REMEDIES
in CIGNA v. Amara and the meaning of its holding with respect to the
equitable relief now available under section 1132(a)(3) of the statute.
Part IV remarks on an emerging battle concerning the scope of ERISA
preemption of "saved" state insurance laws.
II. ERISA: A BRIEF BACKGROUND
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 sounds like
a modest retiring statute, one given to quietly occupying a small corner
of the federal code and addressing itself to an obscure few who know its
innocuous-sounding nickname: "ERISA." Nothing could be further
from the truth. ERISA touches the lives of more people than any law
apart from the tax code.' 0
The history of the statute is well-told and need not be repeated at
length." In the post-war years there was a pension crisis.' 2 Companies
who promised workers what we now call traditional pensions-a fixed
monthly payment based on tenure and average salary-engaged in a
series of abuses related to those deals.'3 Pension money was stolen or
mismanaged, workers were not paid what they were promised, and in
some cases company bankruptcy prevented workers from seeing a penny
of their expected pension.14  Congress spent years studying the
appropriate solution to the problem, the legislative result of which was
ERISA.'
Regarding traditional pensions-which ERISA called "defined
benefit" pensions-ERISA took a series of affirmative regulatory steps,
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also Douglas H. Shulman, Comm'r,
Internal Revenue Service, Prepared Remarks before Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, Mass.
(Nov. 14, 2011) available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Prepared-Remarks-of-IRS-Commisioner-
Douglas-H.-Shulman-before-Harvard-Kennedy-School,-Cambridge,-Massachusetts (stating that the
IRS touches "almost every adult American.").
11. For a thorough description of ERISA's history, see generally WOOTEN, supra note 4, at
51-79.
12. See PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STRAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34443,
SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 2 (2011) [hereinafter
PURCELL & STRAMAN, SUMMARY OF ERISA].
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 683, 683-84 (2001).
The most notorious of these bankruptcies was that of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation. Id. This
major company had not allocated assets to meet its obligations to pay the pensions of its employees
in the event of its financial failure. Id. When it did collapse, it defaulted on payment of its
employees' retirement pensions, resulting in devastating harm to the financial security of its former
employees. Id.
15. See generally WOOTEN, supra note 4, at 51-79.
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including the strict regulation of funding, vesting, and anti-cutback
requirements.' 6
ERISA (including a series of amendments) also governed other
retirement bargains made incident to employment, such as 401(k) plans,
which are called "defined contribution" plans.' 7 ERISA took less
affirmative regulatory action with respect to these "defined contribution"
arrangements.
Finally, and most significantly, ERISA has governed "welfare
plans," of which the most important was and is health insurance offered
by an employer to its employees.' 8 As has been said repeatedly by many
scholars, the inclusion of health insurance into ERISA-a statute
conceived and written to regulate pension promises-was an ill-
considered "afterthought."' 9 ERISA provided virtually no affirmative
regulation of employment-based health insurance.20
However, all three types of arrangement-defined benefit, defined
contribution, and health insurance-were subject to ERISA's remedial
scheme, which set forth the rights and remedies that ERISA
beneficiaries (among others) could bring to obtain judicial relief 21 For
our purposes, three remedies matter.2 2
The first remedy, provided in section 1132(a)(1)(B), is a remedy to
16. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1054 (2006).
17. See PURCELL & STRAMAN, SUMMARY OF ERISA, supra note 12, at 3-4. See also 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006).
18. See PURCELL & STRAMAN, SUMMARY OF ERISA, supra note 12, at 7. See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) (2006).
19. See, e.g., WOOTEN, supra note 4, at 281 ("In the political history of pension reform, there
was little discussion of employer-sponsored health plans."); Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The
Renaissance ofLaissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law ofEmployee Benefits, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 153, 165 (1995) (ERISA's drafters gave "relatively little thought to the problem of health
benefits...."); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 29 (2001) ("Health benefits were included in
ERISA as an afterthought, with little consideration given to whether the same regulatory framework
would work .... ).
20. In the language of the statute, ERISA governs two kinds of "employee benefit plans." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3) ("The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare benefit
plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan
and an employee pension benefit plan."). A pension plan is "any plan, fund, or
program ... established or maintained by an employer" that "provides retirement income" or
"results in a deferral of income by employees." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Pension plans
come in two types: "defined benefit" and "defined contribution" plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34)
(defined contribution), 1002(35) (defined benefit).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006).
22. See Peter IC Stris & Victor A. O'Connell, Enforcing ERISA, 56 S.D. L. REv. 515, 515,
519-20 (2011) (noting that the substantive rules of ERISA are almost exclusively enforced through
private civil actions brought under sections 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), and (a)(3)).
342 [Vol. 30:339
ERISA'S REMEDIES
obtain benefits that are due under the plan but not paid, i.e., benefit
denials.23 It has serious judicially imposed limitations, including (1) no
consequential or punitive damages, 24 (2) a requirement that a benefit
denial must be internally appealed to the plan administrator prior to
seeking judicial relief, and (3) that the plan administrator is entitled to
"deference" in his rulings if the plan language affords the administrator
discretion.25
The second remedy, provided in section 11 32(a)(2) is the "fiduciary
breach" remedy.2 6 It also has significant limitations, requiring either a
loss to the plan or a personal gain to a fiduciary.27 Specifically, what
section 11 32(a)(2) effectively authorizes is a derivative suit brought by a
plan participant on behalf of the plan to obtain recovery loss to it or
personal gain to the fiduciary.28 The plan is the direct beneficiary of any
remedial judicial resolution. Section 1132(a)(2) does not provide any
remedy for the participant as an individual.29
The third remedy, provided in section 1132(a)(3) is the "catchall"
remedy.30 Section 1132(a)(3) claims permit the recovery of "appropriate
equitable relief."3 1 In a strange but true line of decisions, the Supreme
Court has held that "appropriate equitable relief' means such relief as
was "typically available" in equity in the days of the divided bench.32
Accordingly, the relief available under section 1132(a)(3) demands a
searching historical inquiry; only if there existed at equity a historical
analog to the claim being asserted can an 1 132(a)(3) claim lie.33
How these remedies interact with each other-and with state law
that attempts to speak to similar topics-is discussed in more detail
below.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 11 32(a)(1)(B) (2006).
24. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985).
25. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § l l32(a)(2) (2006).
27. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. at 140.
28. See id
29. See id. at 142 (stating that the statute focuses on the entire plan's participants having a
right to relief as opposed to an individual beneficiary).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006). See also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511
(1996) (describing section 1132(a)(3) as ERISA's "catchall" remedial provision).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 11 32(a)(3)(B) (2006).
32. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011); Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256
(1993).
33. See CIGNA Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1881; Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 534 U.S. at
210-11; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257.
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III. THE MATTER OF VARITY
A. Varity v. Howe
Varity v. Howe involved the question of actionable
misrepresentation under ERISA.34 Defendant Varity owned a
subsidiary, Massey-Ferguson, which included two divisions that were
not profitable.35 Varity planned to spin-off those two divisions into a
separate subsidiary, Massey Combines.36 Varity engaged in a series of
misrepresentations regarding the financial health of Massy-Ferguson to
assure concerned employees that their benefits at Massy-Ferguson were
safe and secure. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer,
determined that the deliberate misrepresentations made by Varity were
made while Varity was acting as a fiduciary, and such a misleading of
beneficiaries amounted to a fiduciary breach. 38 The remedy for such a
breach, held Justice Breyer, was found in section 1132(a)(3), which
permitted issuance of "appropriate equitable relief' for violations of
fiduciary duty.39
In reaching that holding, Justice Breyer explained how section
1132(a)(3) operated. 40 The provision operated as a "safety net, offering
appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that §
[1132] does not elsewhere adequately remedy."4 1  Defendants had
expressed worry that a broad construction of (a)(3) would permit simple
benefit denial claims to be "repackaged" as (a)(3) claims-and thus
avoid the damage limits, administrative exhaustion, and deference
requirements that attach to (a)(1)(B) claims.42 The Court dismissed
those concerns, explaining "that where Congress elsewhere provided
adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for
further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be
'appropriate."' 4 3 In plain English: one cannot repackage a benefit denial
claim under (a)(1)(B) as an (a)(3) claim seeking equitable relief for the
breach of fiduciary duty committed in denying the benefit, absent some
34. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 492 (1996).
35. Id. at 493.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 493-94.
38. Id. at 506.
39. Id. at 515-16 (emphasis in original).
40. See id. at 507-15.
41. Id. at 512.
42. See id at 513-14.
43. Id. at 515.
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special need to do so.
The holding has caused considerable confusion among courts.
Several courts have interpreted Varity to announce a special pleading
rule, namely that a plaintiff cannot plead both (a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) claims
in the same complaint, apparently under the theory that an (a)(1)(B)
claim "cuts off' any (a)(3) claim." That is not the correct interpretation
of Varity.
Plaintiffs may plead alternative theories of relief.45 Recall that
section 1132(a)(1)(B) claims must turn on the content of the plan.46 If,
therefore, a plaintiff asserts a section 1132(a)(3) claim arising from
something other than the plan, e.g., a misrepresentation about what the
plan terms were, then the plaintiff is pleading two different claims
arising from different factual predicates. There is nothing in Varity that
suggests that the assertion of a claim about the plan's content renders
unpleadable (a)(3) claims that turn on facts independent of the plan's
language.
The rationale is straightforward: a section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim is
akin to a contract claim based on the language of the plan.47 If the
plaintiff is correct about the language of the plan, the plaintiff will win.
If the plaintiff is not correct about the language of the plan, the plaintiff
will lose. In contrast, if the (a)(3) claim arises from a different asserted
factual predicate, e.g., that fiduciaries made a series of oral
misrepresentations that the plaintiff relied on to his detriment, then that
claim is entirely independent from, and utterly unaddressed by,
(a)(1)(B). A court might agree with the defendant on the (a)(1)(B)
claim, that is, it might agree that the plan does not provide for the benefit
44. See, e.g., Korotynska v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2006)
(agreeing with those courts who "have not allowed claimants to proceed with § 1132(a)(3) claims
where relief was potentially available to them under § 1132(a)(1)(B),"); Ogden v. Blue Bell
Creameries U.S.A., Inc., 348 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining "that an ERISA plaintiff
who has an adequate remedy under Section 502(a)(1)(B) cannot alternatively plead and proceed
under Section 502(a)(3)"); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer 238 F.Supp.2d 831, 835 (E.D.Tex.
2002) (declaring that "a potential beneficiary, even if ultimately unsuccessful, suing to recover
benefits under section 1 132(a)(1)(B), may not utilize the "catchall" provision of section 1 132(a)(3)
to recover equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty"). The Second Circuit, in contrast, gets it
right: Varity "did not eliminate the possibility of a plaintiff successfully asserting a claim under both
§ 502(a)(1)(B), to enforce the terms of a plan, and § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty." Devlin
v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89 (2d. Cir. 2001) (holding same in dispute
involving alleged misrepresentation of benefits due). See infra note 48.
45. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(3).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
47. As noted above, section 1132(a)(1)(B) authorizes participants and beneficiaries to bring
suit to "recover benefits due . . . under the terms of [the] plan" or to "enforce . .. rights under the
terms of the plan."
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sought, while at the same time agreeing with the plaintiff that the
defendant engaged in misrepresentations that, independent of the plan's
terms, constituted actionable harm to the plaintiff.48
B. Cigna v. Amara
That is precisely what happened in Cigna Corp. v. Amara.4 9  In
Amara, the plaintiffs sought relief under (a)(1)(B) and (a)(3).so The
(a)(1)(B) claim was that the plan entitled the plaintiffs to a pension of a
specified amount; the plaintiffs claimed, however, that the particular
"plan documents" specifying that entitlement were various summary
plan descriptions. 1 On appeal from the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court decisively held that summary plan descriptions are not plan
documents. 2 As the actual language in the plan was not at issue with
regard to the plaintiffs' claim for benefits, 53 the Court found that relief
under (a)(1)(B) was inappropriate.54 The Court, with Justice Breyer
writing for a six-justice majority that included Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Alito, and Justice Kennedy, specifically explained that the
plaintiffs' (a)(3) claims were live, under at least three equitable theories
- surcharge, estoppel, and reformation.
If (a)(1)(B) operated to cut off the pleading of (a)(3), then the
Amara Court could have simply rejected the plaintiffs' (a)(3) claims on
the grounds that such claims were barred by the assertion of an (a)(1)(B)
claim. The Court did no such thing and did not even need to explain
why; there is no serious question that (a)(1)(B) claims can only possibly
bar (a)(3) claims when the latter is simply a repackaging of the former.
48. If, however, the (a)(3) claim is simply a repacking of the (a)(1)(B) claim-i.e.,
"defendant breached his fiduciary duty by violating the terms of the plan and not granting me
benefits, and therefore I am entitled to (a)(3) relief' -then Varity's language suggests, absent
special circumstances, that equitable relief will not be appropriate. It will be a rare case where the
pleading will be so clear that the (a)(3) claim is merely a repackaging of the (a)(1)(B) claim. Most
of the time, a clever attorney will base an (a)(3) claim on a factual predicate different than a plan
violation, and only discovery will reveal whether there is, in fact, a different predicate for the (a)(3)
claim. In that case, the appropriate means of dismissal will be a granting of summary judgment.
49. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). Interestingly enough, Amara is a
decision well known for something else-expansion of the meaning of "appropriate equitable
relief' under section 1 I32(a)(3)-that has caused confusion in an entirely different way, which will
be discussed in the Section III.
50. See id at 1871.




55. See id at 1878-80.
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If there was a question as to whether a plaintiff could plead both
(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) claims (when the latter is a misrepresentation claim),
the Court no doubt would have addressed the issue. It did not.
The Amara Court's sanction of "reformation" as an equitable
remedy should conclusively resolve confusion as to whether pleading
(a)(1)(B) can bar (a)(3) claims in misrepresentation cases; it cannot. The
Amara Court's holding distilled is that (1) plaintiffs' (a)(1)(B) claim
failed because the plan language did not entitle them to the pension they
sought, but (2) because of misrepresentations and omissions in the
summary plan descriptions, the plaintiffs were entitled to pursue
equitable relief under (a)(3) that would "reform" the plan consistent
with their expectations.56 That could not possibly be the case if the
pleading of (a)(1)(B) barred (a)(3) relief. The validity of decisions
predating Amara suggesting otherwise are almost certainty no longer
good law.
IV. THE MATTER OF AMARA
In Amara, the dispute involved a cash balance conversion.57 Prior
to 1998, CIGNA promised retiring employees a pension based on length
of service and level of pay. In 1998, it converted that entitlement into
a "cash balance" to be increased annually by contribution. 59 The
plaintiffs alleged that "CIGNA had failed to give them proper notice of
changes to their benefits, particularly because the new plan in certain
respects provided them with less generous benefits."6 o
Plaintiffs sought relief under both (a)(1)(B) and (a)(3). 61  The
district court held that plaintiffs were entitled to relief under (a)(1)(B)
and thereafter "reformed the new plan and ordered CIGNA to pay
benefits accordingly." 62 The Second Circuit affirmed and adopted the
district court's reasoning.63 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that (a)(1)(B) could help
plaintiffs.65 That provision, the Court explained, is intended to enforce
56. See idat 1877-80.
57. See id at 1870.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 1871.
61. See id. at 1870-71.
62. See id. at 1871.
63. See id at 1876.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1877.
2013] 347
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL
the terms of the plan as written.66 In Amara, there was no dispute about
the actual terms of the plan; the dispute was whether CIGNA had
properly noticed plaintiffs of the new terms.6 ' The plaintiffs and the
Solicitor General had argued that communications about the plan, in
particular SPDs, were in effect a part of the plan that could be enforced
via recourse to (a)(1)(B). 8 The Supreme Court rejected that argument-
communications about the plan are not the plan-and then concluded
that the appropriate provision for relief was (a)(3). 6 9  That provision,
explained the Court, justified recovery under historically equitable (and
thus cognizable) theories of reformation, estoppel, and surcharge
(assuming plaintiffs could show facts establishing the elements of those
theories of relief). 70  Because the district court had not articulated its
holding through equitable theories cognizable under (a)(3), the Court
ordered remand.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred that an
(a)(1)(B) claim cannot apply in misrepresentation cases, but attacked the
majority's discussion of the equitable remedies available under (a)(3) as
dicta.72 In aftermath of Amara, several courts have followed Justice
Scalia's lead, concluding that its discussion of cognizable equitable
remedies was "dicta."73 There are two problems with that reasoning: (1)
the Court's holding was not dicta, and (2) even if it were, it is difficult to
imagine a stronger signal from the Court that lower courts should permit
recovery in (a)(3) cases under theories of reformation, estoppel, and
surcharge.
"The distinction between dicta and holding is notoriously hard to
66. See id at 1876-77.
67. See id at 1868.
68. See id at 1877.
69. See id at 1877-78.
70. See id. at 1878-80.
71. See id at 1882.
72. See id. at 1884 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("The Court's discussion of the relief available
under § 502(a)(3) and Mertens is purely dicta, binding upon neither us nor the District Court.").
73. See, e.g., Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.
2012) ("In dictum, the Amara Court stated that, under appropriate circumstances, § 502(a)(3) may
authorize three possible equitable remedies: estoppel, reformation, and surcharge."); DeFazio v.
Hollister, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 770, 805 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ("In [Amara] the Supreme Court
discussed, in dicta, the ability to award equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3)." (emphasis in original));
Sconiers v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 830 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("the Supreme
Court recently blessed the equitable remedy of contract reformation for mistreated ERISA
beneficiaries under Section 1132(a)(3), albeit in dicta."); Kenney v. State St. Corp., CIV.A. 09-
10750-DJC, 2011 WL 4344452, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2011) (characterizing Amara's discussion
of relief available under 1132(a)(3) as dictum).
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define." 7 4  I need not wade into that debate here. I offer instead a
pragmatic view of what occurred in Amara, and by that account, it is
quite clear that the Amara section discussing reformation, surcharge, and
estoppel is holding, not dicta.
Before the Court was a dispute over the applicable remedy under
ERISA in the case of a misrepresentation. The district court held that
the applicable remedy was (a)(1)(B); it refused to consider the
applicability of (a)(3).7 ' The majority in Amara concluded two things:
(1) that section (a)(1)(B) is not applicable in misrepresentation cases,76
and (2) that the district court had erred in finding that it need not
consider the applicability of section (a)(3) to the case before it.77
Not considering the application of a given statutory provision is
only error if there is some valid theory under which the provision could
provide the plaintiffs relief; otherwise the failure to consider the
provision is harmless error. In finding error in the district court's refusal
to consider (a)(3), the Court spelled out three legally valid equitable
theories of relief: reformation, surcharge, and estoppel. Prior to this
decision, the Court had not acknowledged the vitality of these three
theories (and, indeed, the prevailing assumption was that they were not
permissible under (a)(3)).79  Declaring these theories cognizable was
obviously part of the Court's rationale for holding that the district court
erred in failing to consider the applicability of (a)(3) to this case.80 The
Court was not offering wise asides about the vicissitudes of life, or
speaking in the alternative, or behaving in any tangential way. It was
explaining why the district court's refusal to consider (a)(3) was wrong
as a matter of law.
More importantly, dicta hair-splitting aside, the simple fact is that
six Supreme Court justices signed onto an opinion expatiating on the
validity of reformation, surcharge, and estoppel under (a)(3). By
comparison, two of the most important pieces of ERISA remedies law
could-and much more strongly than here-be described as dicta. In
74. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of Criminal Laws, 14
GEO. MASON L. REv. 725, 758 (2007).
75. See Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1876.
76. See id at 1871.
77. See id. at 1882 ("Because the District Court has not determined if an appropriate remedy
may be imposed under § 502(a)(3), we must vacate the judgment below and remand.. .
78. See id. at 1879-80.
79. See id at 1876.
80. The first error was concluding that (a)(1)(B) applied. The second error was refusing to
consider (a)(3), even though a request for such relief was before it. The Court in Amara reversed
both errors.
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Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, Justice Stevens said that
consequential damages cannot be awarded under any of the 1132(a)
remedial provisions, despite that the case involved only the meaning of
"appropriate relief' under 1132(a)(2).8' And in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, Justice O'Connor said that a plan can alter the standard of
review courts must apply in scrutinizing an administrator's interpretation
of a plan, despite that the case involved only the issue of what standard
courts should apply.82 When the Court speaks plainly and directly of the
principles that govern, lower courts should take heed.
V. THE MATTER OF PREEMPTION
ERISA preemption is a cottage industry. The application of ERISA
preemption doctrine can be difficult, although the basic parts of the
doctrine are simple enough to describe.
Section 514 of ERISA preempts all state laws that "relate to"
employee benefit plans.84 It is one of the broadest preemptive provisions
in all of the United States Code. That general grant of preemptive
power is constrained by a second section of ERISA, commonly called
the "savings clause," which exempts from preemption state laws of
insurance.86  A third clause, the deemer clause, provides that states
cannot "deem" employee benefit plans to be insurers and therefore can
never regulate an employee benefit plan directly.
Operating independently from section 514 is the doctrine of conflict
preemption, which preempts state law to the degree it conflicts with or
frustrates ERISA's purposes.88  The exemplar category of such
preemption consists of state laws relating to the available remedies for
81. See 473 U.S. 134, 149-51 (1985) (Brennan, J. concurring).
82. 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) ("Neither general principles of trust law nor a concern for
impartial decision-making, however, forecloses parties from agreeing upon a narrower standard of
review.").
83. C.f John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and
Judicial Review ofBenefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1342 (2007).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
85. See Andrew Stumpff, Darkness at Noon: Judicial Interpretation May Have Made Things
Worse for Benefit Plan Participants Under ERISA Than Had the Statute Never Been Enacted, 23
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 221, 229 (2011) (quoting Cal. Hosp. Assn. v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544,
1546 (C.D. Cal. 1983)). See also Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA
Preemption, 56 S.D. L. REV. 500, 508 (2011) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that ERISA's preemption clause should be read broadly" and collecting cases).
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006).
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006).
88. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1987).
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an improper denial of benefits.89 Even if such state laws are saved by
the savings clause, the Supreme Court has held that they are nonetheless
preempted because of an "overpowering federal policy," e.g., the
exclusivity of ERISA's remedies, that limit the operation of the savings
clause.90
The Ninth Circuit recently grappled with the issue in Fossen v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, Inc.91 In that case, the plaintiffs
brought a putative class action alleging, inter alia, that the defendants
had violated Montana's unfair insurance practice statutes, which prohibit
rate discrimination by insurers in setting group rates.92
The plaintiffs were three brothers (the "Fossens") who owned a
small farm and purchased health insurance available to employers who
were members of a business association.93 The plaintiffs alleged that in
2006 and thereafter Blue Cross raised their premiums by an
impermissible amount in response to the health conditions of the
plaintiffs' employees or beneficiaries.9 4 The Fossens filed suit in
Montana state court in 2009.95 The defendants removed to the District
Court for Montana, and the district judge dismissed the case.96 On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the panel held, among other things, that the
plaintiffs' unfair-practices claim (and related breach of contract claim)
were not preempted by ERISA.9 7 The defendants sought review by the
Supreme Court, and the petition was identified by SCOTUSblog as a
"petition to watch."9 8 After calling for the views of the government, the
Court denied certiorari. 99
Although certiorari was not granted, the larger issue is still open: to
what degree do ERISA's remedies operate to pull into federal court (and
likely displace) saved state law? The leading Supreme Court opinion on
point is Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.100 Davila, crucially, used careful
language to cabin the preemptive holding to state laws that related to
89. See id. at 56.
90. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200,216-17 (2004).
91. 660 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2011).
92. See id at 1102.
93. See id. at 1105.
94. See id. at 1105-06.
95. See id. at 1105.
96. See id. at 1106.
97. See id at 1114.
98. Matthew Bush, Petitions to Watch I Conference ofJune 14, 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 8,
2012, 4:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-june-14-
2012/.
99. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, Inc. v. Fossen, 133 S. Ct. 979 (2013).
100. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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claims for the denial of benefits, i.e., state laws that could be read to
"supplement" or "duplicate" (a)(1)(B) claims.' 0' Saved state laws that
speak to regulatory matters other than benefit denials were outside the
scope of the Court's opinion.102
The Court's specific test in Davila was a two-part test: (1) if the
"individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under
section 502(a)(1)(b)," and (2) if "there is no other independent legal duty
that is implicated by [the] defendant's actions," then the saved state law
would be completely preempted.'0o A few observations regarding this
test and the scope of preemption follow.
Section (a)(1)(B) is a very specific and narrow cause of action: a
claim for benefits under the plan.104 It is a pure remedy; the area of
overlapping state law that it will preempt is reasonably well-defined, i.e.,
state law regarding causes of action and damages. In contrast, (a)(3) is
an equitable remedy that redresses any violation of the plan or the
statute. 0 It only takes a little bit of bootstrap reasoning to have (a)(3)
swallow up virtually the entirety of state law. Consider: because many
states use the constructive fiction that all contracts in the state
incorporate background law, all of that state's insurance law becomes
terms of the plan and theoretically becomes subject to remedy per (a)(3).
Putting aside the second prong of the test, that would require, quite
literally, that every insurance regulation in the state could only be
enforced in federal court as incorporated state law, and only to the
degree the relief sought was cognizable under an equitable theory
recognized in the days of the divided bench. That Congress intended,
via implicit preemption, to federalize the entirety of insurance regulation
beggars belief. Congress does not "hide elephants in mouseholes." 0 6
Incorporating the entirety of state insurance law into ERISA via
constructive fiction qualifies.
The second part of the Davila test-making preemption contingent
on the absence of an independent legal duty-confirms this intuition.
Insurance has long been an area of state dominion, and much of that
regulatory function involves matters that have little to do with remedy-
101. See id. at 221 n. 7.
102. See id. at 217-218.
103. Id. at 210.
104. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
106. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 116 (2008) (quoting Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
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rate setting, public disclosure requirements, licensing, etc.' 0 7 It would
thus be very odd if non-remedial regulatory functions like rate-setting
were preempted by a "catch-all" cause of action as nebulous as (a)(3).
Faithful application of the independent legal duty requirement in Davila
will prevent such odd results. Core regulatory insurance functions, by
their nature, create independent legal duties unrelated to the existence of
an employee benefit plan or ERISA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Neither ERISA nor the court decisions interpreting the statute are a
model of clarity. The latest round of confusion is the last in a series of
episodes that have ensnared jurists for almost forty years. One wonders
if any statute has sewn as much confusion, with as much frequency, as
has ERISA. Let us hope not.
107. Walter W. Heiser, Due Process Limitations on Pre-Answer Security Requirements for
Nonresident Unlicensed Issuers, 88 NEB. L. REV. 494, 496 (2010) ("Each state has the power to
regulate insurance companies who conduct business within the state's boundaries.").
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